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COMING INTO EQUITY WITH CLEAN HANDS*
Zechariah Chafee, Jr.**
The preceding article proposed to examine eighteen differing groups
of cases which are commonly supposed to present the clean hands doctrine as a maxim of equity, and then proceeded to consider eight such
groups. Ten groups still require attention. The first five of those already
considered fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of equity, and the next
three within the concurrent jurisdiction, which is continued for a considerable part of the present article. After discussing suits for specific
performance of unfair contracts and of illegal contracts, I dealt with miscellaneous tort suits by a person charged with crime. We now turn to
several important types of injunction suits against specific torts.

In this article, as in its predecessor, it is desirable to keep two questions in mind: First, is the plaintiff's misconduct more detrimental to
him in equity than it would be if he were suing for damages? Second,
how much is the supposed general principle of unclean hands shaped by
the rules and policies of this particular group of cases, so that it is transformed into a substantive defense for a specific wrong?
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST ToRTS

9. Suits to protect copyrights and literary property.104 Lord
Eldon's sensitiveness to objectionable qualities in Southey's Wat
Tyler- 05 and Byron's Cain106 has been shared by less eminent judges
dealing with poorer literature. Thus in England in 1916 Elinor Glyn,
the author of Three Weeks, was unable to stop the production of a
photoplay burlesquing of this novel and entitled Pimple's Three
Weeks. 101 Justice Younger relied partly on the point that the book
was "indecently offensive," remarking that perhaps courts were less
strict in Lord Eldon's day, but "to a book of such a cruelly destructive
,,. The second of two articles adapted from the lirst two Thomas M. Cooley Lectures
given by Professor Chafee in April of this year at the University of Michigan. In the discussion, A represents applicant for equitable relief, and R represents his opponent, the respondent.
The lirst article appeared in the May issue of the Review-Ed.
*"" Langdell Professor of Law, Harvard University-Ed.
104 2 PoMEROY, EQ. Jums., 5th ed., §402a (1941); Rogers, "Copyright and Morals,'' 18
Mi:cH. L. RBv. 390 (1920).
.
105 See discussion in prior article, 47 Mi:CH. L. RBv. 877 at 883 (1949).
106 Ibid.
101 Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co., [1916] 1 Ch. 261.
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tendency no protection will be extended by a Court of Equity."108 A
more satisfactory reason for the decision was unwillingness to discourage parodies. It would have been tragic if the owner of the copyright
in Ivanhoe had been able to stifle Thackeray's Rebecca and Rowena.109
United States district judges in San Francisco, which is not usually
regarded as a Puritanical environment, have been especially allergic
to the excessive portrayal of feminine charms. In 1867 Judge Deady
declined to protect the favorite legshow of our ancestors named the
Black Crook from a Chinese copy called the Black Rook.110 According
to the judge, A's copyrighted play was filled with "women in novel
dress or no dress. . . . The closing scene is called Paradise, and . . .
consists mostly of 'women lying about loose'. . . . To call such a spectacle a 'dramatic composition' is . . . an insult to the genius of the
English drama."111 Unfortunately, Judge Deady was born too soon
to read the opinion of Justice Holmes upholding the copyright in
lithographs of circus women whitened to resemble statues:
"It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only
to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictoral illustrations . . . [ C] opyright would be denied to pictures
which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet . . .
the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt."112
Thirty years after the Black Crook case, Judge Morrow was equally
shocked by a copyrighted song about Dora Dean-"She's the hottest
thing you ever seen." The superlative adjective, he said, had "an indelicate and vulgar meaning."113 But Judge Yankwich in Los Angeles
takes a more critical attitude in our own time while discussing whether
the photoplay When Tomorrow Comes is borrowed from Cain's novel
Serenade. 114 Judge Knox in New York City is equally sensible about
a novel Hell's Playground and its unauthorized dramatic counterpart
White Cargo.115 Although he found plenty of tropical heat in both,
he nevertheless stopped the play, observing: "so far as morality is
10s Id. at 270.
109 As to the court's

argument that the scenario writer might be immune because he had
added mental labor of his own to the author's work, see Chafee, "Reflections on the Law of
Copyright," 45 CoL. L. REv. 503 at 511 (1945).
110 Martinetti v. Maguire, (C.C. Cal. 1867) Deady 216; 1 Abb. U.S. 356; 16 Fed. Cas.
No. 9,173.
111 (C.C. Cal. 1867) Deady 216 at 221, 222.
112 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 at 251, 23 S.Ct. 298 (1903).
113 Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., (C.C. Cal. 1898) 88 F. 74 at 79.
114 Cain v. Universal Pictures, (D.C. Cal. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 1013. The court found
no plagiarism.
115 Simonton v. Gordon, (D.C. N.Y. 1925) 12 F. (2d) 116.
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concerned, the play is no improvement upon the book. ..."116 But Lord
Eldon, Younger, Deady, and Morrow would have promoted morality
by letting the play go on as well as the book, thus giving the public
a double dose of indecency. May it not be wiser to cut out one dose
by protecting A's copyright in spite of his unclean hands?
Here is one group of cases, at any rate, where we do not need to
speculate about the outcome of damage suits. We have plenty of
direct evidence that questionable books are treated exactly the same
at law as in injunction suits. Lord Eldon, in the Wat Tyler and Cain
cases,117 insists that the only way for A to get an injunction is to
convince a jury first that he has a "property" in the dubious book;
and A has about as much chance of success as the proverbial snowball in hell. For Lord Eldon well remembers what happened to Joseph
Priestley in a law court. That famous pioneer in chemistry and Unitarianism had his house burned by a mob in 1791 because of his sympathies with the French Revolution. Priestley sued the Birmingham
town government (the hundred) for compensation for his heavy losses,
including numerous unpublished manuscripts. He called booksellers
to testify that they would have given considerable sums for these.
Unluckily for him, the judge was our old friend Eyre, the coiner of the
clean hands maxim. When the defense offered evidence that Priestley
was in the habit of publishing works injurious to the government,
Eyre let it in to reduce damages. So the jury gave nothing for the
destroyed manuscripts.118 This unreported case was followed in 1826
when a nonsuit was imposed on the publisher who owned the copyright of the Memoirs of Harriette Wilson, a notorious courtesan.
Brougham argued forcibly against the pirate:
''The doctrine that there can be no propert:}7 like this, rests on a
dictum of Lord Chief Justice Eyre.... And i:he Lord Chancellor
relied on that dictum ... but it is one thing to refuse an injunction, and another to hold that no action is maintainable. . . . Suppose a party to have stolen the book, could he say that he is not
guilty of larceny, because the book was of an improper tendency.
[Littledale, J., said that in larceny, the paper, etc., would be
116 Id. at 124.
117 Southey v.

Sherwood, 2 Mer. 435, 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1817); Murray v. Benbow, 6
PetersdorfF Ab. Cas. 558, note (1822).
118 Priestley's Case, stated arguendo in 2 Mer. 437, 35 Eng. Rep. 1007 (1817). See the
article on Priestley by Alexander Gordon, 46 DrC'l'. NATL. Bro. 357 at 363-364 (1896).
On statutory municipal liability for mob action, see Palmer v. Concord, 48 N.H. 211 (1868)
(destruction of Copperhead newspaper plant by privates bound for Civil War-opinion by
Judge Jeremiah Smith); Ely v. Board of Niagara County, 36 N.Y. 297 (1867) (brothel).
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stolen.] But . . . if [ the doctrine] is applied at all . . . a Court
should hold that even the paper was not protected, if converted
to such a use. The argument used is, that, giving such works no
protection, tends to suppress them. Now this is not so; for the dissemination of such works is much assisted, all the world being enabled to publish them; and if the principle be admitted, it not
only applies where the whole is objectionable, but also where any
part of it is bad."119
His eloquence was useless. Judge Holroyd asked, "How can injury

be done where there is no right to publish?"12° Chief Justice Abbott
said,· "If the plaintiff had no right to sell, how can he maintain an

action?"121 Judge Bayley emphasized "the principle that no person
could have any right of property in any such work."122 And so the
nonsuit stood. The Court of King's Bench sitting in bank sent Harriette Wilson to join· Southey and Byron. Law or equity, it was all
the same to them.
This decision points plainly to the sound analytical reason why
these various courts have denied damages or an injunction against the
pirates who looted illicit literary merchandise. The objection is not
to A's misconduct but to the book itself. The judicial theory is that
the book, whatever its commercial value, is not property, in the sense
of giving rise to interests of substance which any court cares to protect.
In short, the ideas as here expressed are not the subject of ownership.
This judicial theory shows that the defense is not equitable, but
should there be any defense? Indecency is rarely more than part of
a book; it is mixed with other matters like the tares with the wheat.
The copyright act, so far as I can :6.nd, entitles any original work to
registration regardless of moral objections. There are a few statutory
exceptions, such as works in the public domain and government publications,123 but they do not include indecent books. Judges should
be very cautious about introducing exceptions of their own into acts
of Congress. As Holmes pointed out in the circus lithograph case,1 24
persons trained only to the law run a big risk in undertaking to pass
on literary and artistic values. Sometimes the legislature has expressly
119Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 2 Car. & P. 163, 172 Eng. Rep. 75 (1826), S.C. 5 B. & C.
173, 108 Eng. Rep. 65 (1826). See the article on Harriette Wilson by Thomas Seccombe,
62 Dmr. NATL. Bio. 95 (1900).
120 Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 2 Car. & P. 163, 172 Eng. Rep. 75 at 77 (1826).
121 Id. at 78.
122 Ibid.
123 61 Stat. L. 652 (1947).
124 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 23 S.Ct. 298 (1903).
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entrusted questions of obscenity to the courts, as in criminal statutes,
and then judges have to do the best they can, but the results have
been quite erratic.125 This should be a warning against rushing into
new obscenity jobs which no legislature has told them to undertake.
The penalties for obscenity are defined by statute. Why should
the courts add a new penalty out of their own heads by denying
protection to a registered copyright which complies with every provision of the copyright act? To return to my discussion of Wigmore's
solution for illegality in civil suits, I think that the added penalty is
justifiable only if there is a serious need for extra pressure to induce
obedience to the criminal law. In the obscenity situation, this need
is not obvious. The refusal of an injunction multiplies the book and
increases violations of the criminal law. Direct attack by prosecution
is much more effective. It is easy, for the offense consists only of
widely circulated words. No long hunt for witnesses, for example,
is required, as in attempts to run down smuggling and political corruption. The truth is that equity judges have acted in some of these copyright
cases because they knew that juries would not convict the author and
publisher. But if that be the case, a judge has no business to prevent
the community from reading what twelve of its members would think
it ought to be allowed to read.
Much the same considerations apply to literary property in unpublished works, although the want of statutory authorization of the book
makes the argument somewhat less strong. Still, here we have an
interest in privacy superimposed upon the possible commercial value
of the manuscript. Edward S. Rogers thought that the author of an
unpublished work, regardless of its character, should have the right
to determine whether it should be published at all.1 26 Suppose that
A has kept a diary to which he has consigned reflections of an extreme
Freudian sort. If R steals the diary, should A be powerless to prevent
his secret thoughts from flying everywhere because of their obscenity,
the very reason which makes him and every decent man who is not a
judge want to keep the diary locked up? It is odd that Lord Eldon
allowed Mrs. Gee to enjoin the publication of family letters in breach
of confidence,127 and yet a year earlier refused to let Southey preserve
his youthful poetic indiscretions from the world.
1211 See the Strange Fruit case, Commonwealth v. lsenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. (2d)
840 (1945), and the discussion in 1 CBAPEE, GoVl!RNMENT & MAss CoMMaNICATIONS
2()().226 (1947).
126 Rogers, "Copyright and Morals," 18 Mxca. L. RBv. 390 at 404 (1920).
121 G~ v. Pritchard, 2 Swans. 402, 36.Eng. Rep. 670 (1818).
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A more robust theory of copyright law would follow the analogy
of patent law, as exemplified in Fuller v. Berger,1 28 which refuses to
invalidate a patent on a device to keep bogus coins out of slot-machines just because the invention can be used for criminal purposes
and frequently is so used. The best antidote to the over-righteous
decisions I have set forth is found in the opinion of Justice Holmes
in Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co.129 When the Chicago
grain exchange sought to enjoin the unauthorized use of its ticker
quotations by a bucket-shop, the main defense was that the plaintiff
operated the greatest of bucket-shops, that, as Holmes put it, "the
subject matter is so infected with the plaintiff's own illegal conduct
that it . . . may be carried off by any one at will." In granting the
injunction, Holmes wrote as follows:

"If then the plaintiff's collection of information is otherwise
entitled to protection, it does not cease to be so, even if it is information concerning illegal acts. The statistics of crime are property to the same extent as any other statistics, even if collected by
a criminal who furnishes some of the data."130
10. Patent suits.131 Ladas in his excellent book on The International
Protection of Industrial Property states that the clean hands maxim
has no place here, for "equitable principles are not applicable in
patent law, which is statutory law."132 This is going much too far. It
reminds one of Justice Black's attempt in the Mercoid case to do away
with contributory infringement just because Congress says nothing
about any such wrong in the patent acts.133 Plenty of judicial opinions
12s (C.C.A. 7th, 1903) 120 F. 274.
129198 U.S. 236, 25 S.Ct. 637 (1905).
130 Id. at 246 and 251. It is necessary to omit treatment of two interesting situations:
(1) A's book is full of plagiarisms or is deceptive. Thompson v. American Law Book Co.,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1903) 122 F. 922; Merchants' Syndicate Catalog Co. v. Retailers' Factory Catalog
Co., (D.C. ill. 1913) 206 F. 545; Davies v. Bowes, (D.C. N.Y. 1913) 209 F. 53; Stone &
McCarrick v. Dugan Piano Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1915) 220 F. 837; Munn & Co. v. Americana
Co., 83 N.J. Eq. 309, 91 A. 87 (1914). (2) A is violating the state anti-ASCAP license
statute while suing for infringement of copyright in a song. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young,
(C.C.A. 7th, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 972; Interstate Hotel Co. v. Remick Music Corp. (C.C.A.
8th, 1946) 157 F. (2d) 744, cert. den. 329 U.S. 809, 67 S.Ct. 622 (1947); Buck v. Gallagher, (D.C. Wash. 1940) 36 F. Supp. 405. Another interesting question is presented in
Alfred Bell & Co., Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., (D.C. N.Y., 1947) 74 F. Supp. 973.
131 CHAFEE & PouND, CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST TORTS 383, n. 1, 384-391
(1933).
132 Page 329, n. 1 (1930). Ladas ·says this to explain the rejection by American courts
of the specific defense that the owner is not working his patent. See Continental Paper Bag
Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 at 422, 28 S.Ct. 748 (1908).
133 Concurring in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 at
672, 64 S.Ct. 268 (1944).
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in patent injunction suits talk about the patent owner's being subject
to the "equitable" defense of unclean hands.
The present discussion will be confined to two recent Supreme
Court cases which were mentioned at the outset.134 They will suffice
to support my position that the only reason for calling the defense
equitable is that it happens to be raised in an equity suit. What is
still more important, these patent suits are not just an illustration of
Wigmore's general tort principle about the plaintiff's illegality being
a bar. Instead, the defense is part and parcel of patent law. It cannot
be understood except by a knowledge of patent principles. In the Fort
Sill liquor case, we should hardly say that violation of Army liquor
laws was part of the law of conversion, which was the tort charge
against the state officials, but the two cases now to be stated make it
plain that the plaintiffs were denied relief because of a substantive
rule of the very same patent law under which they sought relief.
In Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co. in 1942,135 the salt company
owned the patent on a machine for depositing salt tablets, which was
useful in the canning industry so as to get the right amount of salt
into the food before the can was sealed. It charged that R was infringing the patent by selling a similar kind of machine. The trial
court had not even bothered to inquire whether the patent was valid
or infringed, but dismissed the complaint summarily and the Supreme
Court affirmed this judgment. The reason was that the salt company
was leasing its patented machines to some two hundred commercial
canners on condition that all the salt tablets used with the machines
had to be purchased from a subsidiary of the salt company. Because
this attempt to monopolize unpatented articles through a patent was
an unlawful restraint of trade, the patent was denied protection. Chief
Justice Stone said: "It is a principle of general application that courts,
and especially courts of equity, may appropriately withhold their aid
where the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public
interest."136
The sentence just quoted had very disturbing implications for
patent owners. Was the Supreme Court going to allow every patent
infringer to go scot free if he could establish that the owner of the
patent was somehow or other violating the Sherman Act or the Clayton
134 See 47 M:rCH. L. RBv. 877 at 878 (1949).
1 35 314 U.S. 488, 62 S.Ct. 402 (1942), 40 MrcH.

L. RBv. 1266 (1942). Compare
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Industrial Corp., (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 64 F. Supp.
516, (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 154 F. (2d) 814, cert. den. 328 U.S. 859, 66 S.Ct. 1353 (1946).
1ss 314 U.S. 488 at 492, 62 S.Ct. 402 (1942).
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Act? For years and years little manufacturers who got sued by giant
competitors and knew that_ they were pretty clearly guilty of infringing
valid patents had been trying to divert the judges' attention from their
own misdeeds by charging the plaintiffs with creating an illegal monopoly. This tu quoque defense had been persistently thrown out by
a long line of decisions in the district and circuit courts,1 37 which were
supported in the Supreme Court by. cases refusing to entertain the
same sort of reason to escape paying the price of goods bought from a
big corporation.138 It was hard enough for a federal judge to wend
his way through the intricacies of a patent suit without taking on at
the same time the bailing problems of the Sherman Act. Were all
these cases now thrown overboard? To the patent bar, this was just as
shocking as if a careless motorist were able to defend the subsequent
personal injury suit by proving that the pedestrian had beaten his
wife before leaving his home. If every sizable business which brought
a patent suit kne:w that it might have to become involved in an antitrust suit, the value of patents would be grievously impaired. Not only
guilty patent owners would be deterred from suing. No prosperous
businessman today can be altogether sure that he is not violating some
provision of the Sherman, Clayton, or Robinson-Patman act or some
other federal statute against improper trade practices. Even the businessman who was absolutely confident in his complete compliance
with all of these laws would hesitate to start a patent suit if he knew
that it might very well require him to take weeks away from his normal
productive work in order to review scores of old commercial transactions for the sake of demonstrating his innocence. In short, if the
district judge in many patent suits would be trying the plaintiff instead
of the defendant, few men would care to be plaintiffs.
There would have been no such disagreeable surprise on account
of the Morton Salt case if the defendant had been sued for selling his
own salt tablets to the users of the patented ma~hine and thus aiding
them to violate the restriction in their licenses. It is true that forty years
ago a person who thus aided another to make unauthorized use of a
patented invention would have been liable as a contributory infringer.139 The licensee who was actually using the Morton machine with
forbidden salt tablets would have been liable as a direct infringer of
137 CHAPEl! & PotIND, CAsBs ON EQUITABLB Rl!LIBP AGAINST TonTs 383, n. 1 (1933).
13s Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 23 S.Ct. 431 (1902); Wilder
Mfg. Co. v. Com Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165, 35 S.Ct. 398 (1915).
139 Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1896)
77 F. 288; Henry v. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct. 364 (1912).
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the patent. The sound explanation of these old cases was that the
patentee was simply splitting his monopoly. Just as he could authorize
a licensee to use his patented machine in New England, and keep the
rest of the country for himself, so he could license its use with its own
salt tablets and keep that part of his patent monopoly which involved
the use of the machine with other people's salt tablets.140 But from
1917 on, the Supreme Court took a very different view of the powers
of the patentee. Although this particular method of splitting the patent
monopoly is logically within its scope, nevertheless it is now considered
to be against public policy because of its undesirable consequences in
facilitating the patentee's control over unpatented material. Therefore
the licensee's use of the patented device with other materials is now
declared to be outside the patent monopoly-. It has always been common for the patentee to sue the person supplying the unauthorized materials as a contributory infringer instead of going after the numerous
licensees. After the Supreme Court reversed its position in the Motion Pictures Patent case in 1917,1 41 it repeatedly dismissed suits against
the outsider, holding that there was no contributory infringement. The
court ruthlessly struck down every attempt of the patentee to prevent
rival products from being used by his licensees.142 In none of these
cases did the court invoke the clean hands maxim. Instead, it was concerned with defining the lawful scope of the patent monopoly.
The novel feature of the Morton Salt Co. case is now obvious. The
defendant was not sued as a contributory infringer for selling unauthorized unpatented materials to the patent licensee. He was sued for
direct infringement by making and leasing a machine embodying the
plaintiff's patented invention, or so the complainant said. If the complainant was right, then what the defendant was doing clearly fell within the scope of the patent monopoly. Yet the court did not care if this
was so. Because of what the patentee was doing with the licenses of his
machine, he was not allowed to protect the machine itself from imitation. In the preceding cases, the patentee's attempt to control unpatented materials had prevented any wrong from arising on the part
of the defendants. In this case, it prevented the plaintiff from getting
140 Although this is not the reasoning of the majority or minority in the Dick and Motion
Picture patent cases, it is much more convincing as given by Powell, "The Nature of a Patent
Right," 17 CoL. L. REv. 663 (1917).
141 Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 37 S.Ct. 416
(1917).
142 Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 51 S.Ct. 334,
(1931); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 288 (1938); B.B. Chemical
Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 62 S.Ct. 406 (1942).
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relief for an undoubted wrong. Other patentees who are not imposing
improper restrictions are getting injunctions every week against the
sort of thing this defendant was doing. Moreover, Chief Justice Stone
intimated that the Morton Salt Co. would be able to get an injunction
against this very defendant as soon as it gave proof that the improper
practice of restrictive licenses had been abandoned and that the consequences of its misuse of its patent had been dissipated.
Thus there can be no doubt that the Morton Salt case· does rest on
the plaintiff's misconduct and hence seems to involve the clean hands
maxim. Nevertheless, two points stand out. In the first place what
happened here in equity would probably have happened at law. If the
salt company, instead of seeking an injunction, had asked for heavy
damages while it was trying to force its own salt tablets on its licensees,
it is almost· impossible to believe that the hostile Supreme Court would
have allowed a large sum of money to go to a company which was
using its patent to restrain trade. In a law case of a very different sort
involving a patent, the Sola Electric case,143 the court entertained the
defense of violations of the Sherman Act which were very closely connected with the contract under which the patentee was suing. As
usual, the clean hands doctrine was not mentioned in an action at law,
but it is significant that the lvI.orton Salt case was cited. Secondly, the
plaintiff in the Morton Salt case was barred by a very special kind of
miscond_uct which was held to be inconsistent with the purpose of the
patent system. Although the anti-trust laws were involved, the objection was not that the salt company had entered into an unlawful combination with its competitors or was violating those laws by transactions
disconnected with the patent in suit. The trouble was that the patentee
was using his patent, so the Chief Justice said, "as the effective means
of restraining competition with its sale of an unpatented article."144
And again he said that the patentee, being the holder "of an exclusive
privilege granted in the furtherance of a public policy, may not claim
protection of his grant by the courts where it is being used to subvert
that policy."145 Two years later, ·in the Mercoid case, Justice Douglas
cited the Morton Salt case for the proposition that the Court would
withhold its aid from a patentee "where the patent was being misused."146 This all brings me back to the fundamental proposition with
which I began discussing this group of cases: the supposed defense of
clean hands here is really a substantive rule of patent law.
143 Sola Electric Co.
144 Morton Salt Co.
145 Id. at 494.
146 Mercoid Corp. v.

v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 63 S.Ct. 172 (1942).
v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 at 490, 62 S.Ct. 402 (1942).
.
Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 at 670, 64 S.Ct. 268 (1944).
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The same is true of the different sort of plaintiff's misconduct in
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery
Co. in 1945.147 A sold torque wrenches developed bx its employee,
Zimmerman, who had applied for a patent. Another employee,
Thomasma, who had worked with Zimmerman, secretly gave information about the wrenches to an outsider, Larson. Thereafter, Larson applied for a patent on the same newly-developed wrench. He and
Thomasma and another man organized a new company, R, to supply
the requirements of A's chief customer. R succeeded in taking away all
that business from A, although Thomasma went on working for A,
until he was found out and :fired. Of course, the two applications
clashed, so the patent office declared an interference. When Larson
:filed his preliminary statement in this proceeding, he put in all sorts
of false dates so as to get well ahead of Zimmerman's true dates
as to conception, disclosure and reduction to practice. A, having acquired the Zimmerman application, smelled a rat and got a lawyer to investigate. After thus discovering the true situation, A said nothing to
the patent office, but made elaborate agreements with R and the fraudulent Larson to settle everything. The upshot of this happy arrangement was that both Zimmerman and the Larson patents were issued
and owned by A. Then R, as might be expected, started making
wrenches again. A sued R for infringing the two patents.
In dismissing the injunction suit, Justice Murphy did speak of the
clean hands maxim as the "guiding doctrine in this case" and as a
"doctrine ... rooted in the historical concept of court of equity...."148
Yet he would, I believe, have been equally anxious to dismiss a damage
action based on Larson's fraudulent patent.149 And when Justice Murphy gets down to brass tacks, he makes it plain that the defense in this
case grows out of the very texture of patent law:
"[Patents] ... are matters concerning far more than the interests of the adverse parties. The possession and assertion of patent
rights are 'issues of great moment to the public.' . . . A patent by
147 324 U.S. 806, 65 S.Ct. 993 (1945). Accord: Mas v. Coca-Cola Co., (C.C.A: 4th,
1947) 163 F. (2d) 505. Somewhat similar problems are raised by Keystone Driller Co. v.
Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 54 S.Ct. 146 (1933), where A suppressed evidence in
sustaining a patent and was consequently denied an injunction involving this patent and four
others.
148 324 U.S. 806 at 814, 65 S.Ct. 993 (1945).
1 4 9 The argument is not quite so strong for denying damages for infringement of the
Zimmerman patent, for that was not obtained by lies. Possibly the Court objected to its being
snatched out of the interference proceeding by the dubious agreements. These same difficulties apply to the refusal to protect that patent by an injunction.
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its very nature is affected with a public interest. As recognized by
the Constitution, it is a special privilege designed to serve the public purpose of promoting the 'Progress of Science and useful Arts.'
At the same time, a patent is an exception to the general rule
against monopolies and to the right of access to a free and open
market. The far-reaching social and economic consequences of
a patent, therefore, give the public a paramount interest in seeing
that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud
or other inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept
within their legitimate scope....
"The history of the patents and contracts in issue is steeped in
perjury and undisclosed knowledge of perjury....
"Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office
or who are parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncom:promising duty to report to it all facts concerning possible fraud
or inequitableness underlying the applications in issue. . . . Only
in this way can that agency act to safeguard the public in the £rst
instance against fraudulent patent monopolies. . . . The public
policy against the assertion and enforcement of patent claims infected with fraud and perjury is ... great...."150

I I. Suits to protect trade-marks or trade-names.151 In the earliest
case in this group (1857), a soap was called "Balm of a Thousand
Flowers," but contained no flowers. Judge Duer of New York denied
an injunction against piracy of the name, saying "Those who come into a
court of equity ... must come with pure hands and a pure conscience."152
The same moral reflection has been echoed over and over in similar
cases. Yet when we examine the leading cases, we £nd eminent judges
demand more than this. They take many pains to relate the defense
of deceptiveness in the mark or name to the reasons why trade-marks
and trade-names are protected at all. Thus Judge Duer, in this very
soap case, hit the nail on the head when he said he ought not to sanction "An exclusive privilege for deceiving the public."153 Lord Westbury in a case where the mark called leather cloth "tanned" which was
untanned154 made an elaborate analysis of the theory of protection and
150 324 U.S. 806 at
151 NrMs, LAw oF

815, 816, 818, 819, 65 S.Ct. 993 (1945).
UNFAIR CoMPETinoN, 3d ed., 976-1009 (1929); DERENBERG,
TRADE-MARK PROTECTION & UNFAIR TRADING 659-680 (1936); 2 CALLMANN, LAw oF
UNFAIR COMPETITION & TRADE-MARKs 1416-1431 (1945); CHAFEE & PoUND, CAsEs ON
EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST ToRTs 372-381 (1933).
152 Fetridge v. Wells, 13 How. (N.Y. Pract.) 385 at 389 (1857).
153 Id. at 389.
1 5 4 Leather Cloth Co., Ltd. v. American Leather Cloth Co., Ltd., 4 DeG. J. & S. 137,
46 Eng. Rep. 868 (1863).
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concluded that when the symbol contained a false assertion, "no property can be claimed on it ... the right to the exclusive use of it cannot
be maintained."155 And Justice Shiras took the same position in refusing his aid to "California Fig Syrup" which had no figs. 156 In other
words, A is thrown out because his fraudulent mark does not present
any interests which the courts care to protect. Still, not every lie in the
mark or name is a bar.157 The only way to know where to draw the line
is to think hard about the business function of these symbols. As the
famous Eau de Cologne case shows, the real question is what customers care about.158 The focus of attention should be A's right and not
his ethics.
This view applies at law just as much as in equity. Suppose that A
has registered a mark which misleads the public so that he cannot enjoin an imitator. Instead, A tries to get treble damages under the federal statute. Surely, he should lose. Or take a case where suit is not
based on a statute. The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan did not succeed
in preventing banished members from using the name, because of the
order's gross violations of law in fomenting riotous gangs, and so on.159
I doubt whether the order could have maintained an action of conversion for the value of the robes and regalia which the banished members
carried away, or an action of money had and received for the funds they
had illegally collected by enrolling new members.
The Lanham Act of 1946160 bears out my position that deceptiveness vitiates the mark. Section 2 makes unregistrable any mark which
"Consists of or comprises ... deceptive ... matter"; section 14 (c)
allows registration of such a mark to be cancelled on the application
of any person interested. And it is also possible to cancel the registration of an assigned mark which "is being used by, or with the permission of, the assignee so as to misrepresent the source of the goods ...
in connection with which the mark is used...."161 These various provisions seem to bar a damage action as much as an injunction suit.
It is a little harder to fit into my view those cases which refuse an
155 Id. at 144.
156Worden v. California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516 at 528, 23 S.Ct. 161 (1903).
157Paris Medicine Co. v. Brewer & Co., (Mass. 1936) 17 F. Supp. 7 (cold cure); Newbro v. Undeland, 69 Neb. 821, 96 N.W. 635 (1903) (baldness cure); NIMs, LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, 3d ed., 1000 (1929).
158 Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd. Muelhens, Inc., (D.C. N.Y. 1929) 38 F. (2d) 287,
revd. in (C.C.A. 2d, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 937, cert. den. 282 U.S. 881, 51 S.Ct. 84 (1930).
159 Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Strayer, (D.C. Pa. 1928) 26 F. (2d) 727, affd. (C.C.A.
3d, 1929) 34 F. (2d) 432.
160 60 Stat. L. 427 (1946).
161 Id. §§2, 14(c).
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injunction to protect a non-deceptive mark, on the ground that its
owner has used misrepresentations elsewhere, for example, in his advertising.162 Since the mark is all right in itself, is not the bar caused by A's personal misconduct? My reply is that what is basically safeguarded in
trade-mark cases is the market, not thy mark. "In short, the trademark
is treated as merely a protection for the good-will, and not the subject
of property except in connection with an existing business."163 The
trade-mark is the means by which A strengthens· his expectancy of
drawing customers to his door. When this expectancy is vitiated by
fraudulent advertising, the court may not think it worth bothering
about. The symbol of a bad business is thrown out along with the
business, which is the main thing.164
Finally, does the defense make sense, however we analyze it?
Might not a more intensive consideration of the policies of trade-mark
law lead to its virtual abandonment, in accord with the observation of
Judge Coxe half a century ago:
"It would seem that this rule might be modified so as to permit
the court, for the protection of the general public, to enjoin both
parti.es...."165
Nims pungently describes what Judge Duer actually did about "The
Balm of a Thousand Flowers" soaps:
"The pi;oduct of the plaintiff was a mixture of palm oil, potash,
alcohol and sugar. The defendant's concoction was of a similar
character. Yet in the face of the perfectly obvious fact that both
parties were equally guilty of fraud on the public, the court refused relief on the ground that the plaintiff was grossly deceiving
the public, and by this decision permitted both parties to continue
their objectionable practices. . . .
"It is impossible to believe that the power of the court of equity
to-day over parties standing at its bar is so limited that, before releasing them, it cannot issue such orders as will insure henceforth, from both plaintiff and defendant, honorable methods of
competition at least as respects the practices set out in the pleadings."1s0
162 CHAFEE & PoOND, CASES ON EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST ToRTS 379-381 (1933).
163 Justice Pitney in Allen & Wheeler Co. v. Hanover Star Milling Co., 240 U.S. 403
at 414, 36 S.Ct. 357 (1916). See the whole passage.
164 The beginning of §43 of the Lanham Act supports this position: "use in connection
with goods .•• any false ••• representation.••."
165 Hilson v. Foster, (C.C. N.Y. 1897) 80 F. 896 at 901.
166 N1Ms, I.Aw OF UNFAIR CoMPETITION, 3d ed., iv (1929).
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Because A's California :6.g syrup has no :6.gs in it, A is punished by
giving the public two ":6.g syrups" with no figs. Deception continues
with confusion combined. Derenberg and Callmann are equally critical of the unsatisfactory results of the clean hands doctrine in this
group of cases.167 Judicial preoccupation with morality has here, as in
the copyright cases, brought about an increase of immorality.
No doubt there are practical obstacles to reform, as Callmann indicates. For a judge to decide flatly :~gainst both private parties to a
suit in which the public has no representative does not :6.t well into our
adversary system of justice. Nevertheless, the Lanham Act points the
way to a feasible remedy although this statute does not surely provide
it. As already stated, the act allows A's deceptive mark to be cancelled
in an administrative proceeding.168 Possibly such cancellation is not yet
authorized in an equity suit brought by A. Still, a simple amendment
would allow a counter-claim by R to obtain cancellation. But this will
not altogether remove the current evils. It will not stop A from using
his now de-registered deceptive mark, and how can R be enjoined under the Lanham Act from continuing his unregistered deceptive mark
at the suit of A, who no longer has a federal right? Perhaps section 43
helps out by authorizing a civil action on the part of any person who
believes he is damaged, against any person who "shall affix ... or use in
connection with any goods ... any false description or representation,
including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same...." Yet it is not clear that R, who has been imitating
such a wrongful mark, can maintain this civil action, inasmuch as the
doctrine of unclean hands might be applied in reverse.
The most fruitful suggestion is found in the proviso at the end of
section 14, authorizing the Federal Trade Commission to apply for
cancellation of trade-marks on various grounds, including deceptiveness. This action would be facilitated if the commission were given
the right to have notice of every federal trade-mark suit or unfair competition suit ( whether under the Lanham Act or the diversity jurisdiction)
in which the defense was made that the imitated symbol was deceptive.
Then the commission could intervene if it thought wise and could also
seek cancellation of any registered mark involved, besides entertaining
cease and desist proceedings against either or both parties to prevent
the continuance of their unfair trade practices.
When the law is thus enabled to deal effectively with the total sit101 DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTECTION & UNI'AIR TRADING 662
MANN, I.Aw OF UNPAIR CoMPEnTION & TRADE-MARKs 1431 (1945).
10s 60 Stat. L. 427 §14(c) (1946).

(1936); 2
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uation, the clean hands doctrine is likely to become a minor matter in
this group of cases.
·
The time has come to invoke another old maxim, "Don't hit a man
when he is down.". There is no need for me to go on battering the
clean hands doctrine at length through all the remaining seven groups
of cases. So in most of them I shall show rather briefly how the defense
of plaintiff's misconduct belongs to the substantive law of the particular subject.

12. Labor litigation. 169 An employee who seeks judicial aid against
a union wil). be thrown out of court if he has himself acted outrageously, for instance, by grossly underpaying his women employees and
thus consciously forcing them into immorality to cover living expenses.170 But his refusal to arbitrate a strike was not a bar;171 otherwise the court would virtually enforce compulsory arbitration, which
not even the legislature can do constitutionally.172
Here again, the scope of the defense is not a matter of ethics. It
really depends on the court's view of the part which governmental
agencies ought to play in the management of labor relations. This is
brought out by the fourth recent Supreme Court case mentioned in my
preceding article,1 73 National Labor Relations Board 11. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co.174 Now the shoe was on the other foot, for the union
had behaved badly. Furthermore, it was an administrative. case, but the
problem was just the same as if it had been strictly a suit in equity.
The NRLB had petitioned a court for enforcement of an order
against the employer, and the union sought to intervene. Thereupon
.the employer charged the union with dynamitings and other forms of
violence. The circuit court of appeals remanded the case to the board,
with directions to take additional evidence about such wrongs and to
modify its order as the evidence required. This decision was affirmed
by a majority of the Supreme Court. The opinion by Justice Jackson
shows how the Court was viewing the union's misconduct, not as a
personal bar to relief, but as an element in the total situation confronting the NRLB in this case. Consideration of violence, he said, is not
always necessary:
169 2 PoMEROY, EQ. Jums., 5th ed., §402d (1941).
170Brimelowv. Casson, [1924] 1 Ch. 302.
171 Berg Auto Trunk & Specialty Co. v. Wiener, 121 Misc. 796, 200 N.Y.S. 745 (1923).
172Wolff Packing Co. v. Ct. of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 43 S.Ct. 630 (1923).
173 47 MICH. L. R:Ev. 877 at 878 (1949).
174 318 U.S. 9, 63 S.Ct. 394 (1943).
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"Charges that violence has been threatened or encouraged are
frequent and easy in negotiations that proceed in an air of belligerency. . . . The Board is not required to sidetrack proceedings involving an employer's violation of the labor law while it explores
irrelevant derelictions of parties or witnesses or acts of unknown
or irresponsible persons.
"... But courts which are required upon a limited review to
lend their enforcement powers to the Board's orders are granted
some discretion to see that the hearings out of which the conclusive findings emanate do not shut off a party's right to produce
evidence or conduct cross-examination material to the issue. . . .
"The Labor Relations Act contemplates submission of disputes
as to labor practices of employers to reasoned and impartial determination after full and fair hearing. . . . [T] he process of
presenting cases to it must be kept free from forces generating bias
or intimidation. Dynamiting or display of force by either party
has no place in the procedures which lead to reasoned judgments.
The influence of lawless force directed toward parties or witnesses
to proceedings during their pendency is so sinister and undermining of the process of adjudication itself that no court should
regard it with indifference or shelter it from exposure and inquiry.
The remedies of the law are substitutes for violence, not supplements to violence, and it is proper that courts and administrative
bodies so employ their discretion as to dispel any belief that use of
dynamite will advance legal remedies."175
The total labor situation was also viewed by the dissenters, Justices
Black, Douglas, and Murphy, but with different conclusions. The
evils of dynamiting do not justify the delay, which further board hearings will cause, in protecting employees who are innocent of wrongdoing in their freedom to bargain collectively. Justice Black said:
. "[T] he fundamental issue which the Board decided here is
whether [a rival union] is company-dominated.
" ... [C] ompelling the Board to digress from the adjudication
of a labor dispute in which such dynamiting has no part into a
pursuit of the guilty, punishes the innocent employees of respondent rather than the evildoers themselves."176

In short, both sides in the Court agreed that the union's misconduct
was material or not, accordingly as it was an element in. a proper administrative control of this labor dispute.
11r; Id.
11a Id.

at 27-29.
at 33, 35-36.
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13. Suits to enjoin torts of various kinds, where A has committed
similar torts against R or otherwise wronged him.111 When, for example, A complains that R is trying to take away A's customers and it
turns out that A is using the same improper methods to capture R's
customers,1 78 or when the parties are stealing each other's trade secrets
through spies,1 79 the court may appeal to morality in words like "The
want of honor among thieves is not a ground of equitable jurisdiction."180 Still, as in the tort group concerned with the plaintiff's illegality, we usually have a substantive defense of torts. The situation resembles the doctrine of contributory negligence; the wrongs of the two
parties are so entangled that no cause of action arises.
Occasionally, as in the group concerning specific performance of
unfair contracts, the denial of relief may not preclude a suit for damages. Here too, the sound explanation for the distinction lies, not in
equity's being more ethical, but in the greater severity of the injunction as compared with money compensation. In handling the drastic
remedy of an injunction, a court should weigh all the factors in the
situation. A good analogy is furnished by the doctrine of balance of
convenience. Practical considerations rather than morality may render
it desirable to give the plaintiff damages instead of specific relief.
MisCELLANEOUS GROUPS INCLUDING MATRIMONIAL CASES

This finishes the groups where A plainly has his choice of going
into equity or law. I conclude with a few more groups where he probably has no chance to sue at law.
14. Suits to enforce building restrictions and other equitable servitudes.181 If A and R own lots in a restricted tract, that A is himself
177 2 POMEROY, EQ. Jurus., 5th ed., §402a (1941); CHAFEE & PouND, CASES ON
EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST TonTs 412-413 (1933); 7 A.L.R. 305 (1920); Weegham v.
Killefer, (D.C. Mich. 1914) 215 F. 168, (C.C.A. 6th, 1914) 215 F. 289; Williams v. Dutton,
184 ID. 608, 612, 56 N.E. 868 (1900); Bldg. Comrs. v. C. & H. Co., 319 Mass. 273, 65 N.E.
(2d) 337 (1946); Comstock v. Johnson, 46 N.Y. 615 (1871); Peters v. Case, 62 W.Va.
33 at 39, 57 S.E. 733 (1907).
178 Sano Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1942) 3 F.R.D. 181.
179 Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 588, 62 A. 881 (1906),
revd., 72 N.J. Eq. 387, 67 A. 339 (1907), 6 MxcH. L. REv. 57 (1907); see Vulcan Detinning
Co. v. Assmann, 185 App. Div. 399, 173 N.Y.S. 334 (1918); DeForest Radio Co. v. Radio
Corp. of America (N.J. Eq. 1926) 132 A. 496.
180 Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 588 at 601, 62 A. 881
(1905).
181 1 CHAFEE & SIMl'SON, CASES ON EQUITY, 1st ed., 792, n. 2 (1933), n. 49; CHAFEE
& PoUND, CAsEs ON EQUITABLE RELIEF AGAINST TonTs 412 (1933); 34 HARv. L. REv.
786 (1921); Ward v. Prospect Manor Corp., 188 Wis. 534, 206 N.W. 856 (1926).
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violating the restrictions may influence the court to refuse to enjoin a
threatened violation by R. In many such cases, the real trouble lies
in A's right and not in his personal behavior. Because of what A has
done, the servitude is gone. It is a basic principle of these building
schemes that they last only while their purpose can be carried out.
When the purpose disappears, it is no longer worth while for courts to
bother with the scheme. Now, the purpose may be destroyed by all
sorts of causes. Extensive violations by one or more lot-owners are only
one such cause. The presence of a plaintiff's misconduct in that situation is only incidental, for an equally effective destruction of the purpose can come from the lawful alterations of the dominant land as in
the British Museum case,1 82 or from violations by other lot owners without A's participation,1 83 or from neighborhood changes over which A
has no control whatever.184
Occasionally, A's violation does not make it impossible to preserve
the purpose of the restrictions. Under such conditions, a denial of the
injunction for A's unclean hands hurts, not only A, but also lot-owners
who had hoped to benefit by his suit and forces them to start a new
litigation to protect themselves. It would seem more economical to let
A enjoin Rand also give Ran injunction against A, so that the other
lot-owners will profit doubly from this suit. Or, the court might apply
,the principle that he who seeks equity must do equity, and enjoin R
on condition that A cures his own violation.
In any event, the court should consider the whole tract and not just
one faulty individual, the plaintiff.
15. Matrimonial litigation. 185 It was an evil day when the first
American judge to speak of clean hands186 had the bright idea of injecting the maxim into the very place where it would work its greatest
mischief. In dealing with a marriage, judges have an especially strong
duty to look at the total situation, and not let the result tum on the
ethical behavior of a -single individual. Marriage does not involve just
one person. Indeed, most of its difficulties as well as its delights come
from the basic fact that it takes two to make a marriage. And besides
the other spouse, whose appearance as defendant rather than plaintiff
182 Duke of Bedford v. Trustees of the British Museum, 2 Myl. & K. 552, 39 Eng. Rep.
1055 (1822); 1 CHAPEE & SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY, 1st ed., 842 (1933).
183 CHAPEE & SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY, 1st ed., 1280, n. 4 (1933).
184 Id. 844-64.
185 2 PoMEROY, EQ. Jmus., 5th ed., §402e (1941); CHAPEE & PoUND, CASES ON EQmTAllLE RELIEF AGAINST ToRTS 413n (1933).
186 Mattox v. Mattox, 2 Ohio 233 (1826).
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may be somewhat fortuitous, many more persons are interested in the
formation, continuance, and termination of the relationship. Most obvious are the children (born and unborn) whether of this couple or
from the union of one spouse with a fresh mate. In addition, the
question whether A and R are lawfully married may seriously concern
creditors, federal tax collectors, school authorities, neighbors, and potential £ances of either A or R. Over and above this host of citizens, the
community has all sorts of vital interests, which are not altogether consistent. For instance, as against the policy preferring a permanent family to barnyard matings, there are practical advan.tages in replacing
one hopelessly unhappy childless marriage by two happy and fruitful
marriages, as sometimes happens, rather than condemning each spouse
to celibacy or sin. And if the discordant couple have children, statistics
cannot demonstrate whether they will suffer more from a broken home
or from a nominal home full of hatred and contempt. When society
cannot make up its mind how to reconcile all these competing interests and policies, we ought not to blame judges for being bewildered.
I am certainly not qualified to say which considerations ought to prevail in any case, but what I do say is that a judge has enough to do if he
forces himself to be aware of all these interests and policies and do his
best to evaluate them with reference to the whole family. He cannot
afford to waste his efforts on deciding how to punish one person who
happens to be the plaintiff. He is asked to reorganize the family, and
not to try an offender. If an equity judge is engaged in reorganizing
a corporation which is proved to be in dire straits, he does not devote
his main attention to the moral conduct of the particular creditors who
have put the enterprise under his charge. Instead, he endeavors to
keep it going on new terms, or else distribute the assets so that they
can be used in different enterprises with hopes for better fortune. The
judge's task is much the same when the failure of a family is before
him. The clean hands maxim is an impertinent intrusion on a very
difficult and important judicial job.
Suits within this group are of three sorts: for annulment, for divorce, and for enforcement of normal marital rights like dower pursuant
to a marriage which was contrary to law.
Annulment.187 Being virtually a layman in the field of matrimonial law, I express my unenlightened opinion that there is too much
annulment going on in American courts. When a couple has been
united ceremonially and physically and the relation is not grossly re1s1 See Emmerglick, "'Clean Hands' v. Public Policy in the Nullity of Bigamous Marriage," 4 DAK. L. REv. 3 (1932); 24 MARQ. L. REv. 212 (1940).
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pugnant, for example, for bigamy, incest or extreme youth, then it is
absurd to behave as if nothing had happened. If there be grounds
for termination, they should be causes for divorce and not for nullity.
This would give the judge a better opportunity to deal with the whole
situation of a marriage and not a set of technical problems.
Take, for example, Martin 11. Martin in West Virginia in 1903.188
An uncle and niece went over into Pennsylvania, got married, and returned to West Virginia where such a marriage was voidable. There they
lived together for eighteen years and had a son ten years old. Then the
uncle had a belated repentance in which his wife did not share. In
granting him annulment, Judge Dent gave most of his thought to the
clean hands doctrine and eventually rejected it.
"Their hands may be unclean, but it is the duty of a court of
equity to permit them to clean them when it can do so, and not
permit such uncleanness to continue as a stench in the nostrils of
the people. . . . Such transgressors should get from the public gaze
as quickly as possible."189
The trial judge, who had looked at the family, left the marriage standing, possibly thinking that the statute of limitations had run after
eighteen years. Judge Dent would have done better to think about
a different maxim, "Equity aids the vigilant and not the sleeping."
Still less defensible is annulment _of an old marriage between first
cousins, which several states prohibit by a biological theory which
ignores the brilliant sons of Charles Darwin.
Suppose that a man, A, already married to W, obtains an invalid
divorce and persuades R to become his wife. This triumph of hope
over experience proves illusory, and A wants to get rid of his second
wife too. Do his unclean hands bar him from getting annulment?
Several courts refused to aid him.190 Yet the marriage is wholly void,
and the sooner the community is made sure of that fact, the better.
As in suits to remove cloud on title, it is silly to clutter up public
records with invalid transactions for the sake of punishing sinners.191
Some courts go still farther in the name of virtue, and deny annulment to the woman, who is really married to nobody. They say
her hands are unclean, too, if her eyes were open when she went
through the marriage ceremony with somebody else's husband. Yet
this judicial unwillingness to condone her past sins is very likely to
188 54 W.Va. 301, 46 S.E. 120 (1903).
189 Id. at 302, 303.
100 Ancrum v. Ancrum, (N.J. Ch. 1931)
101 Simmons v. Simmons, (Ct. App. D.C.

156 A. 22.
1927) 19 F. (2d) 690.
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produce more sins. Because she lacks the decree indispensable for a
marriage license, she cannot try lawful wedlock for a change. So her
only choices are to continue sinning with A or begin sinning with
some other man or live in maid~n meditation fancy free.
Consider another frequent situation. A is told by a girl that she is
going to bear his child. A marries her, to :find that she is not pregnant
but only untruthful. Here the marriage is open to no objections of
public policy, but he seeks to annul it for fraud. The Michigan court
in Gard v. Gard192 turned him back into a carefree bachelor under similar circumstances, but the Massachusetts court refused to do so, saying
that it was not impelled by cases elsewhere "to depart from a hard but
salutary rule,"193 and the New York lower courts are equally obdurate.
When a state trooper of 28 had thus been tricked by a schoolgirl of 18,
he was told by the judge that as a policeman he was specially obligated to _obey the law. "The course traveled by the plaintiff leads him
far a:6.eld from the path which a devotee of the stern dame equity is
required to follow as a necessary preliminary to receiving absolution at
her shrine."194
The Michigan Law Review and the Harvard Law Review sympathize with the husband in such circumstances.195 The latter says that
it is unfair of judges to declare that the word of an unchaste woman is
never to be trusted and disregard the motives of a man who believes he
ought to legitimatize his own child. It goes on to stress the sociological evil in the kind of family the Massachusetts and New York doctrine fosters. "It is doubtful how long ... a family founded upon fraud,
. a unit
. ...."196
WI·11 remam
Such emphasis on policies is much more satisfactory than talk about
unclean hands, but there are policies on the other side too. Seduction
is not a straightforward process, so why should the negotiations leading from seduction to marriage be subjected to the high standard of
uberrima fides? "All's fair in love and war," and no statistics are
available to prove that marriages begun by tricks of the trade always
turn out·unhappily. After all, the batting-average for weddings solemnrn2 204 Mich. 255, 169 N.W. 908 (1918). Compare Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich.
568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887).
193 Amov. Amo, 265 Mass. 282 at 284, 163 N.E. 861 (1928).
194 Donovan v. Donovan, 147 Misc. 134 at 135, 263 N.Y.S. 336 (1933), affd. 241 App.
Div. 906 (1934). Accord: Cole v. Cole, 268 App. Div. 564, 52 N.Y.S. (2d) 100 (1944).
Compare di Lorenzo v. di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63 (1903), where the woman
wrote the absent paramour that the child had been born, and on his return exhibited a borrowed baby; this was a little too much, and the resulting marriage was set aside by a divided
court.
19520 MICH. L. R:Bv. 454 (1922); 42 HARv. L. R:Bv. 1081 (1929).
196 Id. at 1082.
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ized without any misrepresentations is none too high. King Solomon
disclaimed knowledge of the ways of a man and a maid, perhaps using
"maid" in a Pickwickian sense, and what baffied that wisest of men may
deter the common run of judges. They may well shrink from the proposal that they upset the most important relationship in life by undertaking to evaluate bedroom intimacies as if they were business offers
and acceptances. Lord Nottingham showed sense when he told. the
Oxford student in this sort of predicament, "this Court should not ...
examine such Matters."197 After all, any marriage involves big risks,
as nobody knows better than a seducer. Marriage is not something to
drift in and out of like a saloon. Marriage is a bright line, crossing
which changes the whole lives of both parties. Nobody can be forced
by law to cross that line, but when a man goes over it he ought to stay
over. At least, he should give his bargain a fair trial. So, instead of
resting on the clean hands doctrine, the Massachusetts and New York
cases should seek justification in the old-fashioned idea of self-reliance.
There are some things a man has to decide for himself, and one of
them is whom he is going to marry. He ought to stand on his own
feet and use his own experience of life, and not rush around to some
judge for comfort if he gets hurt. He has made his own bed and must
lie in it.
At the same time, domestic problems ought not to be subjected to
inflexible rules. There may very well be cases where a marriage between a designing woman and a callow youth ought to be terminated.
The plight of George Warrington in Thackeray's Pendennis calls for
some legal relief. Still, if a marriage begun by a trick turns out badly,
the proper remedy is not rescission but a suit for divorce. Then the
judge can scrutinize the whole family situation in the light of events
since the marriage as well as before it.
Divorce.198 The doctrine of the old Ohio case of Mattox 11. Matto:i199 still prevails in many states. In the Michigan case of Kellogg 11.
Kellogg,200 a wife sued for divorce for extreme cruelty. The husband,
by cross-bill, asked a divorce for her extreme cruelty and adultery. In
denying both spouses relief, Judge Stone said:
197Bodly's

Case, 2 Ch. Cas. 15, 22 Eng. Rep. 824 (1679); FRANcxs, MAxrMs op

EQUITY, 4th ed, 7.
198 Feinsinger and Young, ''Recrimination and Related Doctrines in the Wisconsin Law
of Divorce as Administered in Dane County," 6 Wxs. L. Rev. 195 (1931); 29 Mma. L.
Rev. 232 (1930).
199 2 Ohio 233 (1826). See 47 MICH. L. Rev. 877 at 884 (1949).
200 171 Mich. 518, 137 N.W. 249 (1912). Accord: Smith v. Smith, 146 Ore. 600,
31 P. (2d) 168 (1934).
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"Divorce is a remedy for the innocent as against the guilty, and
should not be granted where both parties are at fault. This is no
more than the application of the equitable rule that one who invokes the aid of a court must come into it with a clear conscience
and clean hands." 201
Judge Maxwell of West Virginia reached still loftier heights of
morality. After setting forth in detail the scabrous transactions of both
the petitioning wife and her husband, he started his reasoning thus:
"What must we say about the conduct of this woman? God's
noblest creation is a good woman. Her virtue is at the summit of
human attributes."202
Having notably fallen below this ideal femininity, she was left on her
husband's hands and he on hers.
Inasmuch as one spouse's adultery is a ground for divorce, this
logically makes both spouses' adultery a double ground, but it turns
out to be no ground at all. And so the sanctity of monogamous marriage preserves the most hopeless union of all.
Judge Cooley once found himself jockeyed, quite against his ,vill,
into the sensible action of divorcing both sinners. In Hoff v. Hoff, 203
the trial court found that each spouse had made out a good case for
divorce and accordingly gave each of them what he asked. The wife
alone appealed. Judge Cooley considered that the trial judge ought
to have dismissed both bills, and left the parties where their misbehavior
had placed them. Courts ought not to occupy their time in giving
equitable relief to parties who have no equities. However, since the
husband had not appealed, Cooley could not make the wife any worse
off than she was below. So she had to keep her divorce, and to be fair,
the good judge let the husband keep his too. What is sauce for the
goose is sauce for the gander. This even-handed justice recalls Judge
Coxe's wish to enjoin both the owner of a deceptive trade-mark and the
imitator thereof. 204
If courts would forget the clean hands doctrine and consider only
the policies involved, they might start asking how much actual good is
accomplished by the substantive defense of recrimination. Let us see
how it worked in an English case. 205
201171 Mich. 518 at 520, 137 N.W. 249 (1912).
202 Edwards v. Edwards, 106 W.Va. 446 at 455,456, 145 S.E. 813 (1928).
20a 48 Mich. 281, 12 N.W. 160 (1882).
204 Supra, p. 1078 and note 165.
205 Pullen v. Pullen & Holding, 123 L.T.R. 203, 36 T.L.R. 506 (1920). See
WISDOM OP Mn. JusncB McCARDrn, edited by Crew, 140 (1932).
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Mr. Pullen was married in 1912, enlisted in 1915, and was sent
with his battalion to Egypt. In July, 1917, he received a letter from
his wife, stating that she had committed adultery and had gone away
with her paramour. The next January she bore this man's child. When
Pullen returned from Egypt he could not find his wife. She had left
their only child in the care of Pullen's mother. In 1919 when he was
demobilized, he met Miss Greatorex. In August, he sued for a divorce.
Immediately afterwards, he committed adultery himself with this
young woman, his first infidelity to his vanished wife. The court found
that Miss Greatorex was apparently a respectable young woman "apart
from her conduct with the petitioner." She and Pullen went on living
together as man and wife. She became pregnant. They were eager
to get married.
Justice McCardie had statutory discretion to set Pullen free from
the dead marriage. Yet he held that "the requirements of public morality," as embodied in the precedents, compelled him to deny relief. "I
must administer the law as it stands"; reform of the law must come
from Parliament.206 Parliament did nothing at all about divorce until
1937, which was too late to help Pullen and Miss Greatorex, and even
then on this point it did not do much. 207
To do justice to the Justice, he made a handsome apology to the
unlucky couple for leaving them in the lurch.
"The result of refusing a decree in this suit may seem strange indeed. For if the wife alone had committed adultery, then the husband could at once have dissolved the marriage. Adultery is presumed to render further married life impossible. But inasmuch as
the husband himself has here committed adultery also, and married life is therefore doubly impossible, the decree must, in accordance with the existing law, be refused. The marriage bond
must continue. I regret this result, but I must administer the law
as it stands."208
Still, this apology was a poor substitute for a marriage license. As
Lord Macnaughten said, "Thirsty folk want beer, not explanations."209
I have given the prize for the worst decision on plaintiff's fault to the
Illinois case of the boy killed in the elevator, but this is a close runner200 Pullen v. Pullen & Holding, 123 L.T.R. 203 at 206 (1920). The English cases
on discretion are reviewed by Lord Merrivale in Apted v. Apted and Bliss, [1930] Pro. D. 246.
207 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 57, §4 (Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937).
20s Pullen v. Pullen & Holding, 123 L.T.R. 203 at 206 (1920).
209Mongomery v. Thompson, [1891) A.C. (H.L.) 217 at 225.
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up. 210 What good did this decision do anybody on earth except the
barrister211 who reprinted it as an example of "The Judicial Wisdom
of Mr. Justice McCardie"?
Divorce exists, not only to enable the spouses to rebuild their lives,
but also to avoid the social consequences of adultery and discordant
personal relations. A decision like this loses the opportunity to substitute a happy and fruitful new marriage in place of a dead marriage
and a liaison. Society gained nothing whatever"from the continuation
of Pullen's first marriage.
Naturally, a divorce should sometimes be refused when both parties
are at fault. The law does not wish to make couples think that they
can get out of a marriage by the simple process of each violating his
vows. Marriage is not a contract which can be terminated by mutual
discord and dissatisfaction. If divorce by mutual consent be desirable,
as some writers say, there are better ways of evidencing consent than
adultery. Of course, judges ought to have some discretion about denying a divorce when the petitioner is unfaithful, but discretion means
the ability to use a practical judgment in shaping the decision so as to
£.t the facts and the needs of the particular situation.
Suits to enforce marital rights. 212 In marked contrast to the cases
just discussed, is the understanding opinion of Justice Brandeis in
Loughran v. Loughran.213 A had been divorced by her husband in the
District of Columbia in 1924. As the guilty party, the code forbade
her to remarry. Nevertheless, in 1926 she married the co-respondent
in Florida. They settled down in Virginia, but it was no case of better
luck next time. They broke up in 1929 with a Virginia divorce from
bed and board. After her second husband's death, A sued his trustees
in the district to establish dower and collect unpaid alimony. The
lower court refused relief because of her defiance of the law in remarrying, but the Supreme Court unanimously reversed, since she had been
a wife for_ three years by the law of her Virginia home and so ought
to get a wife's property rights. After quoting Holmes' statement that a
person "does not become an outlaw and lose all rights by doing an
illegal act,"214 Brandeis observed: "Equity does not demand that its
suitors shall have led blameless lives."235

m.

210 Newton v. lliinois Oil Co., 316
416, 147 N.E. 465 (1925), 47 MicH. L. R.Ev.
877 at 906 (1949).
211 See JumCIAL W1snoM OF Mn. JusncE McCARDrn, edited by Crew, 140 (1932).
212 See Dunbier v. Mengedoht, 119 Neb. 706, 230 N.W. 669 (1930).
213 292 U.S. 216, 54 S.Ct. 684 (1934), 33 MicH•.L. R.Ev. 438 (1935).
214 Natl. Bk. & Loan Co. v. Petrie, 189 U.S. 423 at 425, 23 S.Ct. 512 (1903).
215 292 U.S. 216 at 229, 54 S.Ct. 684 (1934).
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16. Suits concerning corporate and stock transactions. 216 There is
no need to deal with the cases which discuss whether a shareholder who
seeks to inspect the corporate books or hold the directors to their duties
or assert other rights is barred by his miscondtict or motives. The applicable principles are part of the law of corporations. One has to
know the reasons stockholders in general can sue in order to decide
whether this stockholder cannot sue. For example, if his purpose be to
aid a competing corporation and ruin the defendant, this is perhaps inconsistent with the shareholder relationship by virtue of which he
claims.

17. Suits for contribution, subrogation, and other remedies of a
surety.211 This group begins with the clean hands maxim itself in
Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea. 218 We find such difficult problems as
the right of a fraudulent grantee to be reimbursed for paying taxes and
outstanding mortgages.219 A tax collector deposits some of the public
funds in a bank, without getting a surety bond as the statute requires.
The bank fails and he has to make good to the city out of his own
pocket. Do his unclean hands prevent him from being subrogated to
the city's preferred claim ahead of general creditors?220 Is he even
barred from sharing with them? 221
The results of such cases should depend on consideration of priorities in a complex situation, and the clean hands doctrine furnishes
little help.

18. Miscellaneous proceedings in equity.222 This is just a catchall for cases which are otherwise unspecified, so it does not call for any
discussion.
CONCLUSIONS

First, the clean hands maxim is not peculiar to equity, but is simply
a picturesque phrase applied by equity judges to a general principle
210 2 PoMEROY, EQ. Jurus., 5th ed., §402c (1941); CHAFEE & PotTND, CAsEs oN EQurTAllLE RELIEF AGAINST TORTS 396n (1933); Ford v. Buffalo Eagle Colliery Co., (C.C.A.
4th, 1941) 122 F. (2d) 555.
2112 POMEROY, EQ. Jurus., 5th ed., §40lc (1941).
21s 1 Cox Eq. 318, 29 Eng. Rep. 1184 (1787).
219Leinbach v. Dyatt, 117 Kan. 265, 230 P. 1074 (1924).
220 Montgomery v. Ward, 227 Ala. 641, 151 S. 583 (1933).
221 See Schaeffer v. Sterling, 176 Md. 553, 6 A. (2d) 254 (1939).
22 2 Jahn v. Champagne Lumber Co., (C.C. Wis. 1907) 152 F. 669 (creditor's bill);
Vitaphone Corp. v. Electric Research Products, Inc., 19 Del. Ch. 247, 354, 167 A. 845
(1933); Richardson Lubricating Co. v. Kinney, 337 ill. 122, 168 N.E. 886 (1929) (account);
Walsh v. Atlantic Research Associates, Inc., 321 Mass. 57, 71 N.E. (2d) 580 (1947)
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running through da~age actions as well as suits for specific relief. This
principle is that the plaintiff's fault is often an important element in
the judicial settlement of disputes, as well as the defendant's fault.
. Second, this principle of plaintiff's fault has rather weak unifying
qualities. It can better be described as a string around a loose bundle
of separate defenses which somewhat resemble each other. This resemblance may occasionally render analogies helpful, but more significant is the way the effect given to the plaintiff's.misconduct depends
on the nature of his wrong and on the nature of the defendant's wrong.
In other words, this vague single principle gets most of its qualities
in a given group of cases from the substantive law of the particular
subject. It is largely shaped by the human practices and public policies involved in the situation.
Third, the concentration of judges on the clean hands maxim sometimes does harm by distracting their _attention from the basic policies
which are applicable to the situation before them. The matrimonial
suits are a notable example of this bad tendency.
Fourth, the maxim also does harm by. making some courts oversensitive to the ethical conduct of the plaintiff. The copyright cases
illustrate this excessive righteousness, and the point may be further
elaborated by three cases.
Edwards v. Allouez Mining Co.223 was an old Michigan decision in
which Judge Cooley participated. R in 1874 built a stamp mill costing
$60,000 on a creek, and was operating it in copper mining. As a result large quantities of sand were carried downstream and deposited on
bottom lands belonging to X. Next year A bought a parcel of these
ruined lands from X. The land was not bought by A for use or occupation, but as a matter of speculation and apparently to force R to buy it
for three or five times what A paid for it. When R refused to give A
this big profit, A asked an injunction.
Although Judge Cooley, speaking for two out of the three judges
participating, said that A had unquestionably sustained a legal injury
for which he could get damages, he refused the requested injunction.
'Wherever one keeps within the limits of lawful action, he is
certainly entitled to the protection of the law, whether his motives are commendable or not; but if he demands more than the
strict rules of law can give him, his motives may become impor(account); Peltzerv. Gilbert, 260 Mo. 500, 169 S.W. 257 (1914) (taxpayer's suit); Chicago
& N.W. R.Y. Co. v. R.R Comm., 175 Wis. 534, 185 N.W. 632 (1921) (injunction against
administrative order).
22s 38 Mich. 46 (1878).
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tant. . . . If complainant wants more than is reasonable, he
has a right to obtain it under the .rules of law, but he cannot demand the aid of equity in a speculation."224
Chief Justice Campbell, dissenting, pointed out that R had deliberately committed a tort in depriving the downstream owners of the
future enjoyment of their lands, whereas A's conduct was neither a
tort nor a crime. A had a right to buy for speculative purposes.
"It would be, I think, a very dangerous principle to hold that
a civil wrong can be lessened by the motives of the party injured,
so long as he has done no wrong himself. The property of one
man is as much entitled to protection as that of another-not because he bought it or intends to use it without selfish motives, but
because it is property. Any attempt to discriminate would, in my
opinion, leave private interests subject to a discretion which no
man could calculate upon, and make the judicial conscience the
only arbiter of every one's rights."225
George Washington and John Marshall made a good deal of money
out of land speculation. Why then is it wicked? If there be a proper
defense in this case, it is not the clean hands maxim at all. What both
opinions were groping for was some solution of the problem of balance
of convenience. There is considerable authority that if copper mining
was much more valuable to the region than farming bottom lands,
then the mine owner was entitled to a sort of informal eminent domain
through which he could use the downstream land for his debris on paying a reasonable lump sum compensation.226 On this theory, an injunction would be denied, not only to A, but also to X, his grantor who
owned the bottom lands when the nuisance began.
However, the Allouez decision seems to rest on the proposition that
X can enjoin the mining company, but cannot transfer this right with
the land. Judge Cooley does not see that the long-time effect of such
a proposition is to punish any person in the position of X. Although
he is the clean-handed victim of a deliberate tort, he will have a great
deal of difficulty in selling his land. Who wants to pay money for a
pile of constantly increasing debris? So the tort-victim is forced to
win an injunction suit before he sells, in order to get any sort of price.
He may be very reluctant to engage in such an expensive litigation.
224 Id.
2 2 5 Id.

at 51, 52.
at 54. The court then had four members, but Judge Marston did not sit. That
only half of the court made the decision is said to deprive it of much weight. Offiey v.
Garling~, 161 Mich. 351, 126 N.W. 434 (1910).
2 2 6 CHAPEE & PoUND, CAsEs ON EQUITABLE REuEl' AGAINST ToRTS, 313-314 (1933);
McCormick, ''Damages for Anticipated Injury to Land," 37 HARv. L. REv. 574, 587 (1924).
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Suppose he finds a buyer who is willing to take over this burden along
with the land. The possibility of such a deal is cut off by the Allouez
doctrine. 227
Jewel Carmen, a twenty-year old movie actress, made a contract
for several years with Fox at $125 a week for a starter.228 Nine months
later, while still a minor, she made a totally inconsistent contract to
work for Keeney, beginning at $450 a week and going up to a thousand. Keeney was ignorant of her contract with Fox. Soon afterwards,
Jewel came of age and repudiated her Fox contract. Fox thereupon
brought pressure to bear on Keeney, and consequently Jewel found
herself out of a job. She brought a federal suit in New York to have
Fox enjoined from interfering with her contract relations with Keeney.
The decree in her favor was reversed by the second circuit because of
her unclean hands.
Judge Rogers said:
"And if the contracts were voidable because of her infancy, then
... she was under a moral obligation to abide by them. . . . That
no action could be brought against her at law because of what she
did does not alter the moral character of her act. And when she
comes into a court of conscience and asks its affirmative aid to assist her in carrying into effect the inequitable arrangement into
which she unfaithfully entered, the appeal falls on deaf ears."229
Of course, the ancient doctrine of "infantile paralysis," designed
to protect children from improvident bargains, becomes absurd when
applied to annul a contract entitling the minor to over $6500 a year.
The remedy is to change the doctrine by statute, as California has
since done, 23O and not to call the minor immoral. Furthermore, if her
contract right was not worth protecting in equity, it should not have
been worth protecting at law against this sort of interference. Yet the
jury in a New York state court made Fox pay Jewel over $60,000.231
What did she care that Judge Rogers called her unethical, so long as
she brought home the bacon?
In a later Michigan case,232 A was using the name "Mercedes"
as a trade name in his vaudeville act which purported to be an exhibition of thought transference, but was really based on a secret code. A
221 But see Offi.ey v. Garlinger,
22s Carmen v. Fox Film Corp.,

161 Mich. 351, 126 N.W. 434 (1910).
(C.C.A. 2d, 1920) 269 F. 928, cert. den. 255 U.S. 569,

41 S.Ct. 323 (1921).
220 Id. at 931.
230 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1937) §36; Id. (Deering, 1939 Supp.) §§36.l, 36.2.
2 31 See Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 204 App. Div. 776, 198 N.Y.S. 766 (1923).
2 32 Howard v. Lovett, 198 Mich. 710, 165 N.W. 634 (1917). Accord: Fay v. Lambourne, 124 App. Div. 245, 108 N.Y.S. 874 (1908).
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had also advertised his act by a marvelous and wholly .6.cticious life
history of himself. An injunction was refused by Judge Fellows.
To put judicial approval on such methods by protecting a business
built upon such a foundation, would, he said, disregard the hoary
clean hands maxim. The judge would have done better to recall the
maxim, "Mundus vult decipi." I suppose that a conjurer could not
get relief because the white rabbit did not really live in the silk hat.
The judges who decided these cases forgot for the moment that
this is a tough world. 233
Fi~h, a thoughtful consideration of the defense of plaintiff's fault
in connection with the policies of various branches of substantive law
might lead to several improvements on the present situation.
1. In some groups, like copyright suits, the defense might be
discarded altogether or very much cut down. Wigmore's suggestion
about illegality in quasi-contracts would be worth thinking over in
this connection.
2. In other groups of cases the effect of the defense might be
changed in the opposite direction so as to make the court more severe
on both parties. As suggested in the trade-mark cases, ways might
be found to stop the illegal conduct of both the plaintiff and the
defendant. 234
3. The clean hands maxim might be further assimilated to the
maxim "He who seeks equity must do equity." The relationship between the two is fairly close. The clean hands maxim relates to the
past and the doing equity maxim relates to the future. Still, when the
plaintiff's misconduct seems likely to continue unless stopped, we are
really dealing with the future here, too. Instead of dismissing A's
equity suit because of the past, it might sometimes be more useful to
the community to offer him an injunction on condition of his behaving
properly henceforth. This was done in the Morton Salt case,235 and
in a recent Pennsylvania trade-name case, where the injunction was
conditioned on a custom tailor's giving up the deceptive statement that
he was the agent of a woolen mill.236
233 Institute of Automobile Dealers, Inc. v. Chrysler Sales Corp. (Cal. Super. 1942,
unreported), 54 HAnv. L. REv. 879 (1941) (refusal to stop unfair trade practice because
defendant was, member of plaintiff association and thus infected it with his unclean hands);
First Natl. Bk. v. Parker, 87 N.J. Eq. 595, 101 A 276 (1917) (refusal to set aside invalid
spendthrift trust); McVey v. Brendel, 144 Pa. 235, 22 A. 912 (1891) (refusal to protect
union label); Love v. Taylor, (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) 8 S.W. (2d) 795 (Hoover Democrat
barred from Democratic primary).
234 See also Hoff v. Hoff, 48 Mich. 281, 12 N.W. 160 (1882).
235 314 U.S. 488, 62 S.Ct. 402 (1942).
236 Hartman v. Cohn, 350 Pa. 41, 38 A. (2d) 22 (1944), 43 MxcH. L. REv. 409 (1944).
See also Comstock v. Johnson, 46 N.Y. 615 (1871).
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Finally, the rejection of the idea that the principle embodied in the
clean hands maxim is peculiarly equitable, does not mean the destruction of the ethical nature of equity. When Lord Wrenbury made his
oft-quoted statement, "This Court is• not a Court of conscience,"237
he did not have the meaning which is commonly supposed. He was
not saying that all ethical elements were squeezed out of equity in
the situations which normally fall within its jurisdiction, but was
simply dealing with the very special situation before him. The
directors of an insolvent corporation who had received large blocks of
stock as a gift from the chief promoter were asking the judge to vindicate their integrity without going into any issue of liability, legal or
equitable. This peculiar request really asked Lord Wrenbury to pass
moral judgment as if he were a clergyman. Very naturally he hesitated, but eventually he did tell the directors that as between men of
equal so~ial standing, one cannot accept without loss of self-respect a
present of money or shares. Otherwise, he saw no ground for attributing to them a want of personal integrity.238 So Lord Wrenbury behaved like a court of conscience after all. The famous sentence stands
for nothing.
What has really happened is that equity is still ethical, though
not in the oversensitive fashion of some cases, and law has also become
ethical. In almost all our states the same judges may sit one day in a
damage suit and another day in an injunction suit. It is impossible to
believe that they can put on and take off morality at will as if it were
a hat. Cardozo's decisions in damage cases are filled with ethical
attitudes.239 I do not mean to say that law and equity are absorbing
all the principles of morals. Litigation is too rough an instrument to
handle all the delicate questions of conscience which arise in life. But
the factors which divide judicial action from moral judgments seem
to me the same whether the particular suit resembles what used to go
on in chancery or what used to go on in the courts of common law.
If injunctions and specific performance ought sometimes to be refused
in situations where damages are granted, this distinction is due to
· the nature of these specific remedies and not to the existence of different levels of morality inside the judicial system.
237Re Telescriptor Syndicate, [1903] Ch. 174 at 195, 196. See Hanbury, "The Field
of Modem Equity," 45 L.Q.R. 196, 205 (1929).
23s [1903] Ch. 174 at 196.
239 See, for example, Hynes v. New York Central R. R. Co., 231 N.Y. 229,' 131 N.E.
898 (1921).

